Bryan Stevenson’s conflict with prosecutor Tom Chapman over the McMillian case
Just MercyBryan Stevenson’s conflict with prosecutor Tom Chapman over the McMillian case is a struggle over what it means to defend a conviction when the evidence and the community’s account of innocence demand scrutiny. Their first meeting begins with Stevenson offering Chapman a chance to explain the State’s actions; it ends with Chapman refusing to reopen the case, though agreeing to drop a perjury charge against alibi witness Darnell Houston. Later, Chapman participates in arrangements to turn over prosecution and police files, but his continued defense of the conviction leaves the central dispute unresolved: whether legal process will test the State’s story or protect it.
A First Meeting Under Strain
Stevenson sought a meeting with Chapman after learning that Houston had been indicted for perjury. Houston had told the defense that he had not heard from the people who arrested him and had simply been charged. Stevenson understood the indictment as a response to Houston’s communication with the defense and his contradiction of a State witness. He was shocked and furious, but chose not to begin by accusing Chapman. Before filing his motions, he wanted to give the new district attorney an opportunity to explain what was happening.
That restraint came from a hope Stevenson later recognized as difficult to sustain: he had allowed himself to think that the people responsible for the prosecution might be misguided or incompetent, and that some could be reoriented. He knew that some officials were bigoted and abusive, but the indictment of Houston suggested that the State was prepared to intimidate people who might challenge its evidence. His meeting with Chapman would test whether the new prosecutor might take a different approach.
Chapman initially presented himself as courteous and open to a private conversation. He said that he had not been involved in the original prosecution, a distinction Stevenson accepted. Stevenson nevertheless told him directly that he had serious doubts about McMillian’s guilt and the reliability of the conviction. Chapman acknowledged that the case had been a major one, but his lack of involvement in the trial did not lead him to reconsider its result. He said that Stevenson might be the only person who thought the trial unfair.
Evidence, Alibi, and the Perjury Charge
Stevenson answered that doubts about the case were shared by a community, including people who said they had been with McMillian miles away when the crime occurred and employers who were convinced he had not committed it. Chapman dismissed these accounts as uninformed opinions. He maintained that evidence implicated McMillian and that his own job was to defend the conviction. The exchange exposed the gap between Chapman’s reliance on the State’s case and Stevenson’s insistence that testimony and alibi evidence be examined rather than discounted.
The disagreement was sharpened by Chapman’s treatment of Houston. Stevenson asked whether the prosecutor intended to charge everyone who challenged the State’s evidence with perjury. He argued that Alabama law required clear and convincing evidence of a false statement before such a charge could be filed, and that indicting Houston for contradicting a State witness appeared designed to discourage others from coming forward. Chapman questioned whether Stevenson could represent Houston as well as McMillian, suggesting a possible conflict of interest. He then said that he might drop the perjury charges. Since the judge had denied Stevenson’s motion to reopen the case, Chapman said he no longer had an interest in pursuing Houston, while adding that people who made false statements about the case would be held accountable.
That conditional retreat did not resolve Stevenson’s concern. The charge against Houston had already frightened him, and the prosecutor’s warning preserved the threat of punishment for anyone who contradicted the State. Stevenson also pressed the legal importance of Houston’s account: under the State’s theory, Myers was an accomplice, and Alabama law required corroboration of accomplice testimony. Stevenson argued that Hooks’s testimony supplied the necessary corroboration, making Houston’s claim that Hooks was lying an issue the court needed to hear. Chapman ended the discussion by telling Stevenson to raise the matter on appeal. He would drop Houston’s charges, he said, but would do little more.
Defending the Conviction
Stevenson left frustrated not because Chapman had been openly hostile, but because he seemed indifferent to the claim that McMillian was innocent. Chapman had not prosecuted the original case, and Stevenson had hoped that this might make him willing to reconsider a conviction built on unreliable evidence. Instead, Chapman remained committed to defending it. Stevenson concluded that the official narrative had become entrenched even among people who had not created it firsthand.
For Stevenson, the stakes exceeded the fate of one defendant. Black residents had told him they believed McMillian was innocent, and Houston’s indictment threatened those who might support that account. The broader setting made the contest over credibility especially consequential: Alabama’s elected district attorneys were all white in 1987, and racially discriminatory jury selection remained a serious barrier despite legal rulings against excluding Black jurors. Walter’s relationship with Karen Kelly also carried a history of laws and racial politics aimed at policing intimacy between Black men and white women. Chapman’s claim that nobody cared about the relationship did not erase the way race and sex had shaped the case’s public meaning. The evidence does not establish that Chapman personally shared every prejudice within that system; it does show him defending a conviction that Stevenson believed had been sustained by a deeply compromised process.
After Chapman ended the meeting, Stevenson filed his motions so that the State would know the defense intended to fight. He then visited Houston, who was relieved to hear the charges would be dropped but remained shaken by the experience. Stevenson explained that the State’s conduct was illegal and that a civil action might be possible. Houston had no interest in suing, and Stevenson himself thought litigation could expose him to further harassment. Thus, even the limited outcome of the meeting—dismissal of the perjury charges—came after pressure had already been placed on a witness, with no assurance that challenging the State would be safe.
The Dispute Continues
The conflict carried into the post-conviction proceedings. When the Alabama Supreme Court allowed McMillian’s Rule 32 petition to proceed, the defense gained a court order requiring disclosure of police and prosecutorial files. Chapman proposed that the defense come to his office in the Monroe County courthouse for a joint file turnover. Stevenson and Michael O’Connor arrived to meet Chapman and the law-enforcement officers involved in the prosecution, including Sheriff Tom Tate and investigator Larry Ikner. The order created a new opportunity to examine the case, but it did not mean Chapman had accepted Stevenson’s account or agreed that the conviction should be abandoned.
By the time of the later evidentiary hearing, Chapman had called in the Alabama Attorney General’s Office to help defend the conviction. Stevenson and his colleagues had repeatedly sought the State’s files, saying that previously undisclosed exculpatory evidence made them suspect that more material remained hidden. Chapman and the officers had grown tired of the defense’s efforts and increasingly hostile in their dealings with it. Their relationship therefore did not turn on a single argument: it recurred whenever Stevenson sought access to evidence or a fresh examination of the prosecution.
Significance
The encounters give the legal conflict a personal and procedural shape. Stevenson tries first to invite explanation, then argues from the rules governing perjury and accomplice testimony, and finally files motions when discussion fails. Chapman’s response moves from courteous distance to defensive certainty and limited concessions. He can agree to drop Houston’s charge while still refusing to reopen McMillian’s case; he can arrange to produce files while continuing to defend the conviction. That combination makes the relationship consequential not as a simple contest between two temperaments, but as a test of whether formal legal protections will be used to investigate a prosecution or merely invoked after the State has settled on its account.
Stevenson’s disappointment also marks a change in his expectation of what a new prosecutor might do. Chapman’s lack of involvement in the original trial had seemed to leave room for independent judgment. The meeting showed Stevenson that distance from the original prosecution did not necessarily mean distance from its conclusions. Their conflict thus reflects the book’s larger concern with how an official narrative can outlast the evidence that produced it—and how people who contradict that narrative may themselves become targets of the machinery meant to establish truth.